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The paper analyses some of the arguments put forward in the Chancellor's "Five 
Tests" for joining the EMU. It emphasizes that economic analysis provides a 
cost-benefit framework, whilst recognizing that EMU is a political enterprise. A 
positive decision on entry to EMU could be accompanied by some attempts to 
mitigate the economic costs, thus enhancing the net benefits of membership. 
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1 Introduction 
 
What is the proper role of an economist in a debate about such a politically 
charged decision as that of the potential entry of the UK into EMU? Fortunately 
economics itself provides a discipline-neutral framework of analysis in the form 
of the cost-benefit approach. That approach allows 'non-economic' factors to be 
admitted. If, as many probably think, the balance of purely economic factors is 
negative or uncertain, it may still be quite reasonable to see positive political 
benefits justifying entry. It still remains important to examine the economic 
factors carefully and to think of ways in which costs can be minimized. 
 
This paper proceeds in that spirit. First, we recall the cost-benefit 
framework explicitly, as it was put forward by Krugman (1990), building on the 
insights afforded by the conventional economic theory of optimum currency 
areas. In the following section, we recognize in the "Chancellor's Five Tests", 
some of these same considerations and we go on to spell out how they apply to 
the UK. One of the Chancellor's "Five Tests" appears to appeal to a special 
interest group, the City of London. In the next section we ask whether this is a 
proper entry in the national calculus and what developments might sustain it. 
Then we consider the way forward, reviewing three scenarios, a "Canada 
scenario", in which the UK does not join EMU; a "Join now" scenario and a 
"Join later" scenario. The paper argues that the latter is the most realistic scenario 
and discusses some things that need to be done to ensure its successful 
implementation. There are three appendices that discuss in more detail some of 
the aspects economists have explored in relation to the questions addressed. 
Thus Appendix A introduces additional material on the issue of asymmetric 
shocks whilst Appendix B introduces additional material on asynchronous 
business cycles. Appendix C considers differences in the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. 
 
 
2 Optimum Currency Area Theory 
 
Traditionally it is the theory of optimal currency areas that has been used as a 
guide by economists in making sense of these issues. As is well-known, the 
lineage of authorship in this area goes back to Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) 
and Kenen (1969). Much more recently Krugman (1990) set out the theory in 
terms of a cost-benefit framework, which has the added benefit that it can also 
be made, heuristically, to encompass costs and benefits not accounted for in 
traditional economic analysis. Figure 1 reproduces Krugman's suggestion. 
  





Figure 1: Costs and Benefits of Monetary Union 
 
 
The Figure analyses the situation of a country contemplating a currency union 
with a partner or partner-group of countries. Along the horizontal axis is a 
measure of 'integration' - perhaps the economists' traditional measure 
 
(Xij + Mij) / 2Yi 
 
where Xjj, Mij denote, respectively, exports from i to j and imports to i from j and 
Yi is a measure of economic activity in country i. Along the vertical are measured 
costs and benefits to i from the currency union with j. The upward slope of the 
benefit line (BB) suggests that benefits rise with the amount of intra-trade, 
essentially because the currency union arrangement offers the prospect of 
freedom from exchange costs. To these, nowadays, observers might add the 
competitive advantages of increased 'transparency' of relative prices, the 
locational-efficiency benefits of a fixed exchange rate and, in the European 
context, the preservation of the gains from "1992". The extent of intra-trade is a 
plausible measure of the potential extent of all these benefits. Other benefits, not 
related to the extent of intra-trade, can be accommodated simply by shifts in the 
BB schedule. 
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The CC schedule is drawn as downward-sloping in the Figure. The reason 
for this is the suggestion that the value of an independent monetary policy and 
flexible exchange rate (the loss of which is the 'cost' of currency union) declines 
with the openness of an economy. The reason for this (McKinnon (1963)) is that 
the larger the share of tradable goods in the consumer basket the less money 
illusion there will be in wage-setting behaviour and the less powerful, therefore, 
the effect of nominal exchange rate changes on the real exchange rate. The value 
of an independent monetary policy, however, is seen in this approach as 
stemming from its use as a stabilization tool. If a great deal of stabilization needs 
to be done, then the CC schedule should be relatively high. If there is little need, 
then the schedule should be  relatively low  - other things equal. How much 
stabilization needs to be done depends on the size, nature and frequency of 
asymmetric shocks. Where there is a high degree of asymmetry in demand 
shocks, with which monetary policy might be particularly good at coping, then 
the CC schedule should be conceived of as cutting the BB curve relatively far to 
the right; if the degree of asymmetry is low, then the reverse should hold
1. The 
traditional approach also stresses that a high degree of labour mobility or in more 
contemporary terms 1abour market flexibility" constitute alternative ways of 
solving the problem: in the first instance, labour would migrate from the country 
suffering the 'bad' shock to the one suffering the 'good' shock; in the second 
case, labour market flexibility would help absorb the shock by inducing a relative 
fall in real wages in the country suffering the bad shock. Further, a federal fiscal 
arrangement could offer an alternative 'buffering' function, with fiscal transfers 
going from the country with the good shock to the one with the bad shock. 
 
The Figure says, obviously, that a currency union yields net benefits when, 
for given CC and BB schedules, the degree of integration exceeds that 
corresponding to the intersection of the two schedules, since then benefits 
exceed costs. It is obvious that the framework can accommodate a variety of 
circumstances; in particular, perhaps, it suggests that a high level of intra-trade 
may not always be a good indicator of the optimality of a currency union. This 
will depend also on how symmetric are the shocks hitting the candidate 
countries. 
 
                                                                 
1 The theory assumes that monetary policy is, or could be, the 'first best' stabilization instrument and 
indeed that the second best such instrument (fiscal policy?) is a very poor substitute for it. But these 
assumptions can be questioned. Canzoneri et al. (1996) find that real exchange rates do not respond 
appropriately. Erkel-Rousse and Melitz (1995) find monetary policy working as a stabilizer though 
fiscal policy is useful.  
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The OCA approach has come in for a variety of criticisms that must be 
mentioned. First, it omits any serious mention of inflation, yet 
counter-inflationary properties appear to be a leading criterion for the practical 
desirability of a currency union. The Treaty of Maastricht lists criteria, for 
example, which can be read as simply a variety of ways of measuring 
"counter-inflationary commitment". Second, it treats as exogenous what might be 
endogenous -namely, the asymmetry (or otherwise) of shocks. Third, it proffers 
a framework which promises to deliver a quantitative verdict in a common 
numeraire  - a figure of net benefit or net cost, which it cannot in fact provide. 
These criticisms may not be as damning as they sound. First, counter-inflationary 
commitment can simply be added in where appropriate. Second, the issue of 
endogeneity can be tested for  - we note below the "state of the art" in this 
respect and we conclude that a clear result has not yet been established. Third, 
whilst it is not possible to measure a net benefit or cost, it is possible to quantify 
quite a lot and thus to make informative comparisons between countries. 
 
 
3 How do the OCA Criteria Apply to EMU and the UK? 
 
The UK government's "five tests" (HM Treasury, 1997) are as follows: 
 
•  "Whether there can be sustainable convergence between Britain and 
the economies of a single currency. 
•  Whether there is sufficient flexibility to cope with economic change. 
•  The effect on investment. 
•  The impact on our financial services industry. 
•  Whether it is good for employment." 
 
Of these tests, the first two are clearly related to the OCA approach. The third 
and fifth tests have no clear economic theory framework in which they can be 
answered if they are not already covered under the first two heads, and we shall 
set them on one side here. The fourth test is something we discuss a little further 
later on. 
 
Where does the UK stand in relation to quantitative measures of OCA 
criteria, supplemented where appropriate by an inflation criterion? In this section 
we refer to studies based on measures of asymmetry of shocks and to more 
comprehensive studies of the application of the OCA criteria. In all these the UK 
appears as a less obvious candidate than some other countries for membership 
of a European Monetary Union. But this conclusion is not the same as saying 'the  
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UK should not join'. We do not measure all the benefits (nor all the costs). The 
tests are not Pass/Fail. 
3.0.1 Asymmetric Shocks 
 
Possibly the most elusive of the OCA criteria is that pertaining to asymmetric 
shocks. Two methods, broadly, have been pursued in this regard. The first, 
pioneered by Bayourni and Eichengreen (1993), attempts to isolate shocks from 
a "structural" VAR. The second, of which an example is Artis and Zhang (1997), 
attempts to isolate the business cycle and thence views measures of business 
cycle synchronization as corresponding to the desired identification of the 
symmetry of shocks. Both methods have advantages and disadvantages. 
 
Table 1: Shock correlations with Germany 1960-95 
 
supply   demand 
 
EU15 (EU)    0.37    0.57 
Germany (BD) 1    1 
France (FR)    0.40    0.28 
Denmark (DK) 0.46     0.25 
UK      0.24    0.14 
Italy (IT)    0.25    0.29 
Netherlands (NL)   0.34    0.18 
Belgium (BG)    0.53    0.28 
Austria (OE)    0.39    0.32 
Spain (ES)    0.24    -0.03 
Portugal (PT)    0.20    0.16 
Greece (GR)    0.04    0.09 
US      -0.01    -0.22 
Canada (CN)    0.19    0.03 
Norway (NW)   0.24    0.22 
Sweden (SD)    0.19    0.19 
Finland (FL)    0.19    0.02 
 
IMF-codes of countries are given in parantheses and are used as labels 
in some of the subsequent graphs 
 
According to the former method, the initiating shock is separated from the 
transmission process which, incorporating some policy response, mediates the 
passage of the shock through the economy. This separation, however, can only 
be achieved at the cost of imposing some restrictions on the estimation of the 
VAR. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) chose restrictions which correspond to 
the basic assumptions of the simplest neoclassical model: in particular, only 'real' 
('supply') shocks have a long-run impact on output; nominal ('demand') shocks  
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are restricted to have a zero long-run effect. In Appendix A we discuss formally 




when the sample period is extended; in addition we examine the effects of using 
alternative measures of prices and output.. The replication and re-estimation are 
reported in Table 1 here, for all the EU economies (Luxembourg being merged 
with Belgium) together with the US and Canada. As in the original 
Bayourni-Eichengreen paper, we report the value of the correlations of the 
shocks with those affecting the Germany economy, on the assumption that 
Germany should be regarded as the 'centre' of the EMU. The cross- correlations 
are also reported, graphically, in Figure 2. The general run of positive 
correlations is lower than in the sample period originally studied by Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen but it remains true, as in the original study, that a core and a 
periphery can be identified
2. France, Denmark, Austria and Belgium are clearly in 
the core, the Netherlands and Italy being less obviously well identified. The UK 
appears to be less strongly attached and to that extent belongs to a "peripheral 
group". 
 
3.1 Asynchronous Business Cycles 
 
The alternative approach, focusing on business cycle correlations, is also treated 
more formally here in an appendix (Appendix B) since there has now grown up 
quite a large literature on business cycle affiliation and whether there now exists a 
"European Business cycle"; this literature encompasses a number of technical 
issues. Among them are issues as to the most appropriate way to identify cycles, 
                                                                 
2 In their subsequent replications of their original Bayourni and Eichengreen (1996) noted this general 
decline in the correlations, attributing it in part to the impact of German unification.  
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and the correspondence of the synchronization (or otherwise) of cycles to the 
notion of symmetric (or otherwise) shocks. In particular, if the cycle itself is 
conceived as the outcome of a "shock plus transmission process", then policies 
which are idiosyncratic before EMU may both create idiosyncratic shocks and 
affect the transmission process, perhaps producing the impression of wider 
divergence in underlying stochastic experience than is really warranted or than 
will appear in the common monetary policy framework of an EMU. On the other 
hand, differences in the transmission process between countries - whether related 
to underlying behavioural relationships or to the policy transmission mechanism - 
could imply different cyclical responses even to identical shocks; Appendix C 
collects together a brief review of this latter aspect. 
 
Table 2 and Figure 3 reproduce and extend the findings reported in Artis 
and Zhang (1997). The popular Hodrick-Prescott filter has been used to isolate 
the cyclical component. The dampening parameter in this filter can be set a t 
different levels (zero corresponding to the linear trend case) and in this case is set 
to 50,000. Results are reported for a preERM and an ERM period, as in the 
original study. The extended period results largely confirm the findings of that 
original study. In particular, in the pre-ERM period, there is a broadly-defined 
'world business cycle': cross-correlations with Germany and the US are relatively 
similar; after it, Germany emerges as an alternative 'attractor' for most of the 
European economies with  the notable exception of the UK. Whereas the 
cross-correlations of the ERM countries with Germany generally increase 
between the periods, that for the UK falls sharply; and, whilst the UK's 




Table 2: the U.S. and Germany as a benchmark 
 
Pre-ERM   ERM Period 
  D   USA   D  USA 
 
Canada  0.51  0.86  0.26  0.92 
France  0.65  0.72  0.69  0.34 
ltaly  0.37  0.58  0.43  0.30 
NL 0.79  0.43  0.48  0.31 
Austria  0.63  0.44  0.73  0.22 
Belgium  0.69  0.63  0.56  0.18 
Spain  0.48  0.64  0.38  0.17 
Portugal  0.41  0.52  0.30  -0.18 
UK  0.64  0.75  0.16  0.35  













3.1.1 Endogeneity of the Shock Criterion? 
 
The suggestion that a 'European' cycle may have emerged in the ERM period is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the criterion may be 'endogenous'. Frankel 
and Rose (1997, 1998) have been the most eloquent advocates of this view. At 
first blush, as Krugman (1990) has stressed, the formation of a currency union 
has ambiguous effects on the asymmetry of shocks between the member states. 
If the union stimulates more inter-industry trade, it may stimulate more 
specialization producing a propensity to greater asymmetry; alternatively, the new  
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trade generated may be predominantly intra-industry trade, leading to greater 
symmetry. The replacement of idiosyncratic monetary policies by a common 
monetary policy, on the other hand, eliminates one source of business cycle 
difference (idiosyncratic policy shocks), though transmission mechanism 
differences may still lead to wide, possibly even bigger, business cycle 
differences. 
 
Frankel and Rose (1998) provide an econometric test of the proposition 
that increasing levels of bilateral trade are associated with a reduction in 
asynchronous business cycles, obtaining a positive answer. The result has been 
questioned by Imbs (1998), however, on the grounds that the correlation of trade 
and business cycle synchronicity fails to control adequately for third factors that 
influence both variables. It is also an open question how far currency union will 
promote further trade and, to the extent it does so, whether the additional trade 
creation will be of a traditional comparative- advantage type or of the 
intra-industry type
3. Thus the issue is far from closed. An important 
question-mark has been raised about the validity of pre-union evidence on 
stochastic experiences, but no clearly unambiguous answers have yet been 
obtained. 
 
3.1.2 Overall OCA Assessments 
 
Overall assessments of the optimality of EMU for its potential members virtually 
always place the UK in an 'outsider' category'. 
 
Bayourni and Eichengreen (1996) drew up an informal review of the major 
heads of assessment suggested by OCA theory, carefully referencing the relevant 
quantitative studies of these various factors for the European case. In a later 
study ( Bayourni and Eichengreen (1997)) they computed an OCA index, based 
on the contribution of OCA factors to the determination of bilateral exchange 
rates. The variables involved included: a measure of business cycle 
synchronization; a measure of export composition; and measures of country size 
and output-weighted trade intensity. Using this approach they classified a group 
of countries as "convergent" and most ripe for monetary union, another group as 
"converging" and a third one as having shown little sign of convergence. The 
identification of these categories, and their membership overlaps quite strongly 
with the categories subsequently identified by Artis and Zhang (1998a, b) as 'the 
                                                                 
3 Fontagné and Freudenberg (1998) note that not all intra-industry trade leads to greater symmetry; 
specifically, whilst intra-trade of a horizontally integrated type could be expected so to do, 
intra-industry trade of vertically integrated industry, an intra-trade in varieties or qualities, is more 
akin to trade promoted by comparative advantage and may not induce greater symmetry in shocks.  
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core' and the 'Southern' and the 'Northern' periphery. (The anomalies are that 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen place Ireland in the category corresponding to the core 
and France in the category corresponding to the Northern periphery group). The 
UK in all three studies appears in the 'Northern periphery' group. For good or ill, 
the Artis-Zhang studies come as close to a comprehensive formal assessment of 
the optimality of EMU, and the UK's position in relation to it, as any others
4. 




Figure 4: Merging process by group average clustering 
 
Both studies use cluster analysis techniques, the first those of hard clustering, the 
later one those of 'fuzzy' or soft clustering. In each case, Germany is taken to be 
the 'centre' country, variables being measured, as appropriate, with respect to 
Germany. Data are taken for the period 1979.4-1995.10, on a monthly basis, for 
all EU countries (Luxembourg not separately distinguished) with, in the first 
study, the addition of the US, Canada, Japan and two European non-EU 
countries, Switzerland and Norway, as controls. The variables used are the 
following six: (i) the differential between a country's inflation rate and that in 
Germany, (ii) the volatility of a country's real exchange rate vis à vis Germany, 
(iii) the synchronization of a country's business cycle vis à vis Germany's, (iv) 
the synchronization of a country's monetary policy (measured by the cyclical 
                                                                 
4 Of course, there are also many informative informal studies available - a good example being that of 
Taylor (1995).  
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component of its real interest rate) with Germany's, (v) the flexibility of a  
country's labour market with respect to Germany's (measured by the relative 
ranking of its employment protection legislation) and (vi) a country's bilateral 
trade intensity with Germany. The motivation for using these variables comes 
from OCA theory, with the addition of the inflation criterion (where actual 
inflation is used as a proxy for counter-inflationary commitment). Hard clustering 
algorithms work by minimizing the distance between objects (here, countries 
represented by the values of the six variables), progressively forming groups or 
clusters by repeating the minimization after countries join to form a group, or a 
country joins a pre-formed group. By construction, the groups comprise clusters 
of countries which are 'like each other" in respect of  their relationship to 
Germany. Table 3 shows the results obtained, which are also represented in 
Figure 4 as a tree diagram. Hard clustering throws away information in the sense 
that every 'object' (country) has to be assigned to a cluster without regard for 
whether it could nearly as well belong to another cluster. Fuzzy clustering 
remedies this defect; in this procedure "membership coefficients" are calculated 
for each object (country) showing how firmly it adheres to each of the clusters 
nominated. Table 4 shows the membership coefficients computed for the EU-15 
countries (Luxembourg merged with Belgium). The emboldened figures show the 
highest "degree of belongingness" of a country. It can readily be seen that the 
fuzzy clustering results support those of the hard clustering approach. The UK is 
clearly in the 'Northern periphery' group, rather far away from the core group. 
 
 
Table 3. Clusters detected under hard clustering 
 
1. Core Group:    (France, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria)  RMS: .56 
2. Northern periphery:  (Denmark, Ireland, Switzerland, Sweden,  RMS: .81 
    Norway, Finland, UK) 
3. Southern periphery:  (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece)  RMS: .47 
4. North America: (USA, Canada)    RMS:A8 
5. Japan:    (Japan) 
 
Source: Artis and Zhang (1998a) 
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Table 4. Fuzzy clustering: membership coefficients 
 
  Group I   Group 11   Group III 
    (Core)  (Northern)               (Southern) 
France    62.7  19.9  17.4 
Italy    11.6  18.5  69.9 
Netherlands  87.3  7.0  5.7 
Belgium 87.9  6.1  6.0 
Denmark  22.8  58.7  18.5 
Austria   66.7  16.2  17.1 
Ireland    8.4  75.8  15.8 
Spain    8.1  28.7  63.2 
Portugal  2.1  4.9  93.0 
Sweden  3.2  86.8  10.0 
Finland   6.1  82.5  11.4 
Greece   8.1  15.5  76.4 
UK    5.3  82.9  11.8 
 
Source: Artis and Zhang (1998b) 
 
A conclusion can be drawn from this section: based on OCA analysis, with all its 
limitations, the UK is a marginal candidate for EMU. It is not in the core and in 
particular seems to have a different business cycle affiliation from that of the 
countries in the core. The limitations of OCA analysis, however, leave it open 
how far this distance from the core simply reflects the fact that the UK has been 
outside the reaches of the apprenticeship for EMU, the ERM, for most of the 
time; or whether, on the contrary, its absence from the ERM and its reluctance to 
participate in EMU jointly constitute a "rational recognition" of the underlying 
OCA 'facts'. In the event the latter is nearer the truth than the former, there still 




4 The City's Interest 
 
The Chancellor's "five tests" include a reference to the City of London's 
interests. That the interests of one sector of the British economy should be so 
elevated as to figure in a national decision in this way would seem controversial if 
it were not for the fact that the City of London's interests have probably been, all 
along, a determining factor in UK attitudes to EMU. Talani (1999) provides a 
thorough and provocative exposition of this idea. Given the generally positive 
attitude of British industry, the City's role here is reminiscent of the situation 
encountered by Churchill when he reviewed the enthusiasms of the City for the 
interwar return to gold, in contrast to the implications this had for British  




5. City interests have traditionally favoured a minimum of regulation and a 
fear that, inside EMU, such regulation would be encountered, is a motive for 
keeping out; by the same token, if indeed, the EMU leads to regulation when the 
UK is out, the City can profit as the "off-shore banking centre": this prospect has 
also been cited as a motive for staying out. 
 
The contrary fear is that by staying out, the City will fall victim, sooner or 
later, to some practice designed to protect Euro-zone financial activity, hence 
penalizing the City interest. I t is not clear, either, whether there is some 'first 
mover' advantage which the City will forego by not being at the heart of 
Eurozone finance. Geographical location may not be very important; though 
locational agglomeration economies evidently are very important and this seems 
to imply that any incentives given to alternative centres within the Eurozone can 
indeed work to affect the City's built-in advantage of "already being there". 
 
Initial suggestions that the continental taste for (non-interest-bearing) 
compulsory deposits as part of the armoury of monetary policy would be 
transferred to the ECB seem to have proved groundless; compulsory deposit 
requirements are to be part of the armoury, but they will be remunerated and thus 
will barely constitute a pretext for a move to offshore banking in London. This 
source of prospective profit to the City does not seem likely to eventuate. 
Equally, though, what seemed like a possibility that access to TARGET would 
be restricted for the UK in such a way as to inflict higher costs on UK banks 
doing Euro-zone business has not materialized. A source of loss has thereby 
been avoided. 
 
Current indications - based on survey evidence reported in the Financial 
Times - are that 'City opinion' is now markedly more friendly to the EMU option 
than in previous periods, perhaps reflecting that there are no immediate signs of a 
loss to the City in joining EMU. Nevertheless, one of the Euro-zone's "black 
holes" remains that of financial regulation and last resort provision (Prati and 
Schinasi, 1998). What is determined in this area could have repercussions for 
City interests. Meanwhile in the Eurozone, bank mergers are taking place 
designed (mainly, it seems) to bolster the ability of incumbent banks to defend 
their positions in the face of an expected increase in competitive pressures. One 
of the promises of EMU is to make a single market out of the European Financial 
Area; remaining outside may prove a source of weakness for British financial 
institutions wishing to participate in this market. Whether this is so or not, City 
                                                                 
5 "I would rather see Finance less proud and Industry more content" (extract of letter from Churchill 
to Niemeyer, 22 February 1926: see Moggridge D.E. (1972)  
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attitudes possibly are no longer a block on participation in EMU. We can 
consider now the way forward. 
 
5 EMU and the UK: the Alternatives 
 
What is the way forward for the UK? Economic analysis imposes no 
imperatives; the decision is a political one. Present government policy requires a 
positive decision in a referendum to be called in the next parliament. The 
alternatives canvassed seem to be variants on two alternatives: the "Canada 
solution - staying out and not trying to participate; or "joining now", presumably 
without a referendum. 
 
Contrary to some present suggestions, the "Canada solution" is perfectly 
viable; whilst both Canada and, to take examples closer to home, Norway and 
Switzerland, are neighbours of  large common market entities and are obliged 
often to accept the consequences of legislation passed in those entities without 
the opportunity to intervene, all three countries enjoy a degree of independence in 
monetary affairs. The Canadian economy is not dollarized in a way that renders 
the Bank of Canada ineffectual. The UK economy is bigger in relation to the 
Euro-zone than is Canada in relation to the US (16 per cent of GDP as opposed 
to 9 percent). Invoicing of imports and exports in Euro is likely to be more 
pervasive than was invoicing in the DM and invoicing in sterling will no doubt 
decline. But this is a long way from saying that the Euro will somehow subvert 
sterling as a domestic currency. All the evidence we have on currency 
substitution suggests that local currencies are extraordinarily persistent except in 
cases of extreme inflation or where governments take explicit action to encourage 
use of a foreign currency as a substitute. This said, the expectation that the UK 
will join the Euro-zone within a relatively short time would assist its premature 
replacement and current observations may be contaminated by just such an 
expectation; a true Canada solution would remove this incitement, however. 
 
It is impossible to avoid the judgement at this point, however, that the 
full-hearted acceptance of the "Canada solution is not one that the UK can 
manage, if only because its political classes would find it impossible to accept. 
British European policy in the past has exhibited a curious cycle. New projects 
are viewed at first with something approaching disdain, as unworkable. But, if 
workable, they are seen as against the British interest and hence in the next phase 
there is an attempt to sabotage the initiative from within. Then, when the project 
finally comes to fruition, the UK first stands aside and only later participates. The 
cycle arises when the UK is not in charge of the agenda, when the project itself is 
not initiated on a British interest. It is not surprising that the transition from 
disdain and hostility to participation is hard to handle: it would be so even if the  
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disdain and the hostility were justified. If the other countries in Europe are going 
ahead with the project after all, then, even if it would have been better for the UK 
had the project never been initiated in the first place, standing aside from eventual 
participation may not be rational policy. The point of this detour (which in part 
relies on Young (1998)) is to underline that on past experience the Canada option 
is not one the UK is likely to be able to adopt in a full-hearted way. In the end, 
the UK wants to 'be in Europe'. 
 
Clearly, if a full-hearted Canada option is not realistic and participation in 
EMU will come about some day, there must be merit in the Join Now option. 
Delay means being absent from important groundwork and institution-building, 
possibly quite harmful to UK interests, given that participation will occur sooner 
or later. There are two very practical obstacles to embracing this option, 
however. One is the need f or a referendum; the other is the fact that the UK 
cannot decide simply to join. The Treaty of Maastricht sets out some 
requirements for participation, which the UK must meet. The requirement for a 
referendum seems important at two levels; first, the promise has been given and 
any attempt to circumvent it would be subject to severe political attack; second, 
the assurance that the UK is taking a full-hearted decision to participate is 
extremely important, not only for its own democratic merits, but also because the 
chances of a smooth transition to the Euro, may well depend on it. 
 
Whilst the government's current policy path, being conditional on a 
positive referendum, starts with an advantage in respect of being able to assist a 
smooth transition it is subject to all these same obstacles and it is worth spelling 
them out. First, there are the obstacles in the Treaty of Maastricht. The UK can 
reasonably be expected to continue to meet the convergence criteria set out in the 
Treaty in relation to inflation, interest rates, and the fiscal criteria - and without 
any points being stretched, as they were in relation to the debt/GDP ratio for 
most of the current constituents of the Euro-zone. But the Treaty also requires 
that the currency of a candidate country should have been in the "normal" bands 
of the ERM for at least two years, should have exhibited no stress and should 
not have been devalued in that period. There are grounds for expecting some 
leeway in the interpretation placed on this clause in the Treaty. Those grounds 
are that neither Italy nor Finland fulfilled this criterion to the letter, since neither 
country's currency was in the ERM for the full two years, although the exchange 
rate could be judged "stable" for this period; and that there is some sign that 
some governments understand the British public's (presumed) exceptional 
sensitivity to "being in the ERM". But, it seems more than likely that, at a 
minimum, a requirement of exchange rate stability, somehow defined, will be 
made. Not only is there the Treaty requirement; there is also the well-known 
sensitivity of certain countries to the perception that the UK is prone to  
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"competitive devaluation". If there is to be an exchange rate stability requirement, 
possibly followed, after a favourable decision on entry, by a further period of 
transition before the point of fixity is reached, a question must arise as whether 
there will not have to be framework somewhat comparable to that of the 
"ERM-T' to which Denmark and Greece already adhere. The Maastricht Treaty 
is drafted so that the insiders may not keep out any late-joiners simply by will; 
countries that qualify are  obliged  to join. In respect of the exchange rate 
criterion, however, the interpretation of the Treaty is not straightforward and the 
automatic protection afforded to outsiders by the Treaty cannot be relied upon. 
 
A second requirement of the Treaty, which the UK currently does not 
meet, is that in respect of Central Bank independence. The independence granted 
to the Bank of England is instrument-independence; goal- independence has been 
withheld. A Maastricht-compatible independence will require both forms of 
independence and perhaps some other changes to the legislation in addition. 
 
Aside from meeting the Treaty's requirements, it would also be desirable 
for the UK to develop means of minimizing the net costs of EMU participation, 
in the sense of finding an alternative source of stabilization. The Chancellor's 
"Five Tests" refer to labour market flexibility and it is true that more labour 
market flexibility could serve as a substitute. But there are objections to looking 
only in this direction; first, the UK already is, by most measures, the economy 
with the most 'flexible' labour market in Europe. Second, further labour market 
reforms are likely to encounter political resistance. Third, flexible labour markets 
are not pleasant for many participants and, especially for temporary shocks, 
fiscal policy intervention may be regarded as a superior solution. 
 
What needs to be done to fiscal policy in this context may well appear 
inimical to the trend in fiscal policy presentation adopted by the present 
government. What is needed, after all, is flexibility and discretion: flexibility to 
match the needs of the stabilization objective; and discretion to c hoose the 
particular type of fiscal intervention appropriate to the precise stabilization 
problem at hand. For example, variations in payroll taxes (national insurance 
benefits) seem like a proxy for exchange rate changes, whilst fiscal intervention 
to prick an asset price bubble might need to target transactions costs. The return 
to centre stage of policies of the 1960s - stamp duties, 'regulator' tax changes 
and the ghost of SET and the REP -is an unexpected, but logically plausible, 
consequence of entering a monetary union with larger and more cohesive  
RSC 2000/67 © 2000 N. J. Artis 
 
19
partners whose policy interests will dominate and are likely on present evidence 





The evidence reviewed in this paper suggests no "strong" economic case for 
participation in the EMU. If anything, the organizing framework of the OCA 
approach suggests that the UK might be right to stay outside; in particular its 
stochastic experience is different from that of the "core group" within the 
Euro-zone and on these grounds the UK will need a stabilizing policy instrument. 
Membership of EMU would remove the possibility of using monetary policy and 
a floating (or adjustable) exchange rate in that role. Reliance on labour-market 
flexibility alone is unlikely to be enough and, in the event of joining, there will be a 
premium on fiscal policy flexibility. The limitations of OCA analysis are several, 
however; and, besides the room that this gives to "other factors" , including 
political ones, in making the participation decision, there is always the issue of 
the extent to which past patterns of behaviour will continue to hold in the future. 
Whilst we reject the position occupied by some analysts that the worse the 
problem identified the more likely it is to yield to a nice solution (the 
"ever-optimistic Lucas Critique) , it has to be admitted that the power of 
economic analysis alone, based on past behaviour, to identify the net benefits of 
a participation decision is limited. 
 
 
Michael J. Artis 
RSCAS-EUI 
Florence
                                                                 
6 1t is tempting to limit the enjoyment of this spectacle to the few who now recall the 1960s by failing 
to define the SET (Selective Employment Tax)and REP (Regional Employment Premium)! This 
would not be fair, however. The SET and REP were brainchildren of Nicholas Kaldor's. His aim 
was to tax labour used in services and to subsidize labour used in depressed regions.  
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In this appendix, we report on a re-estimation and extension of the simple 
structural econometric model previously used by Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1993). 
 
The idea is to consider a bivariate system of output and prices, X
'
t = [ytpt] 





where the Ai are 2 x 2-matrices and et is a 2 x 1 vector of i.i.d. disturbances with 
covariance matrix W. 
 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen conjectured that the dynamics of the process Xt 
are driven by two types of structural shocks, supply and demand. Let e't = [e
r 
e
n]t  be the vector of structural d isturbances that are assumed to be mutually 
uncorrelated. Bayourni and Eichengreen further assume that the reduced-form 
innovations, et, are just a linear combination of the structural shocks, i.e. 
 
et =:Set   (2) 
 
with some non-singular matrix S. 
 
These assumptions impose three restrictions on the model. To identify the 
structural shocks, one further assumption is needed, however. As in BE, we 
require that only aggregrate supply shocks have an impact on output in the long 
run whereas aggregate demand shocks are forced to be long-run neutral. This 
amounts to imposing a lower-triangular structure on the long-run impact matrix of 




From this, aggregate supply and demand disturbances can be recovered 
uniquely. 
 
Following BE, we initially used annual data for the period 1960-88, where 
output is measured by real CDP and prices by the CDP deflator. The VARs  
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were restricted to two lags throughout following the Schwarzand Hannan-Quinn 
information criteria and in accordance with BE. 
 
Table 1 gives the correlations between supply and demand disturbances. 
Of course, data revisions mean that the numbers are slightly different from the 
BE estimates, but their main result comes through clearly: there is a core of 
European economies, comprising Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
France and also Denmark that share by and large the same structural shocks 
whereas there is a periphery that clearly comprises, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Greece, Sweden, Norway and Finland and also the UK. Figure AI gives a 
synopsis of the information in Table Al. 
 
 
Table Al: Shock correlations with Germany 1960-88 
 
supply   demand 
 
EU15    0.1709  0.3157 
Germany    1  1 
France    0.4818  0.2811 
Denmark    0.5159  0.2985 
UK    0.05187  0.07324 
Italy    0.1373  0.1438 
Netherland    0.5055  0.1726 
Belgium    0.5881  0.3794 
Austria    0.4018  0.3046 
Spain    0.2932  -0.06786 
Portugal    0.2041  0.2023 
Greece    0.1268  0.1824 
US    -0.07801  -0.2051 
Canada    0.1388  -0.04971 
Norway    0.2628  0.2789 
Sweden    0.2907  0.07349 
Finland    0.1935  0.1613 
  





Figure A1: Shock Correlations from the BE Re-Run 1960-88 
 
 
We then extended the sample period to 1995 to see in which respect 
macroeconomic affiliation has changed since the late eighties. Table A2, identical 
with Table 1 in the main text, gives the results and, again, Figure A2 presents a 
synopsis. 
 
The results are interesting: the correlations of the core economies with 
Germany are somewhat lower than in the earlier period and the ones of Italy and 
the UK somewhat higher. Still, there prevails a dichotomy between the core and 
the periphery. The case of the Netherlands is interesting as well: its (in particular) 
supply correlations with Germany drop dramatically, from around 0.5 to 0.3. 
These results are similar to the ones established by Bayourni and Eichengreen 
(1996), in a re-run of their method on an extended data set. A possible 
explanation for these results- besides that of ongoing economic integration that 
deemphasizes the dichotomy of core and periphery  - is the event of German 
reunification which took place in 1990. 
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Table A2: Shock correlations with Germany 1960-95 
 
supply   demand 
 
EU15    0.3673  0.5743 
Germany    1  1 
France    0.4013  0.2834 
Denmark    0.4606  0.2515 
UK    0.2444  0.1394 
Italy    0.2513  0.2881 
Netherlands    0.3353  0.1769 
Belgium    0.5254  0.28 
Austria    0.3947  0.3218 
Spain    0.2411  -0.0327 
Portugal    0.2023  0.1647 
Greece    0.03655  0.09167 
US    -0.01292  -0.2153 
Canada    0.1895  0.02518 
Norway    0.2369  0.2223 
Sweden    0.1911  0.1963 




Figure A2: Shock Correlations w.r.t. Germany for the extended sample period 1960-95. 
 
While BE's core-periphery result is by now a classic, the attention of the 
empirical literature has recently shifted to the endogeneity of the OCA-criteria:  
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will countries converge to the 'core' once they are in EMU? Or should they be in 
EMU only if they are in the core? 
Frankel and Rose (1998) demonstrated that trade linkages are a good 
indicator of the strength of business cycle affiliation across countries. A single 
currency makes prices more transparent by eliminating exchange rate risk, hence 
also leading to increased locational efficiency. A monetary union is therefore 
likely to redirect trade flows among its member states and to alter the business 
cycle affiliation of the participating economies. This may imply that seemingly 
'peripheral' countries could converge by sheer virtue of being EMU members. 
 
It is possible to shed some light on this issue withinin the framework of the 
present model: up to now we have used GDP and its deflator as measures of 
output and prices. But GDP contains a large share of non-tradable goods and 
services and our view of European monetary unification might change once we 
focus attention on macroeconomic fluctuations in tradables output and prices. 
Industrial production can be regarded as a good approximation for tradables 
output. The price level is now measured by the CPI ( the PPI would be 
preferable here, but even though data is available for all countries in our panel, it 
is in some cases reported only from the 1970s or later onwards). Instead, with 
the CP1 as the price index, we can use annual data from 1963-95. Denmark is 
excluded from the panel since no annual IP-data were available. The results for 
all other countries are given in Table A3 and in Figure A3: 
 
The shock correlations vis-a-vis Germany are now generally higher than 
for the GDP-based system, in particular for the demand disturbances. Also, in 
terms of this 'tradables'- based model, the UK seems much closer to the core, 
even though this is largely due to the demand correlations only;  in terms of 
supply shock correlation the UK stays further away from the core. 
 
Figure A4 puts the demand correlations in relation to the trade shares (with 
Germany) that prevailed in 1995 (source: IMF, Directions of Trade Statistics). 
Figure A5 does the same for the supply correlations. 
 
The results are quite striking: there seems to be a clear positive correlation 
between the strength of trade linkages and the correlation of the underlying 
shocks. This relation is particularly strong for demand shocks. It seems plausible 
that a regression line would be almost parallel to the 45-degree line that is drawn 
in the figures. Looking at the supply shock, it is apparent that the UK, Canada 
and the U.S. do not quite conform with the overall impression of a simple linear 
relationship between bilateral trade intensity and the shock correlation. Still, if we 
limit attention to the European core economies, again we would find a linear 
relationship aprallel to the 45-degree line.  
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Table A3: Shock correlations for the 'tradable' system 1963-95 
 
supply   demand 
 
EU15    0.5364  0.8078 
Germany    1  1 
France    0.5097  0.4761 
UK    0.3919  0.5593 
Italy    0.276  0.4731 
Netherlands    0.43  0.4897 
Belgium    0.5726  0.4222 
Austria    0.5192  0.5498 
Spain    0.2597  0.4441 
Portugal    0.2652  -0.07299 
Greece    -0.06753  0.4068 
U.S.    0.3404  0.5446 
Canada    0.2867  0.5604 
Norway    -0.0004886  -0.123 
Sweden    -0.08572  0.4299 




Figure A3: Shock correlations for the tradables system, 1960-95  










Figure A5: Supply shocks and trade shares in the 'tradables' system, 1960-95  
(w.r.t. Germany)  





Asymmetries in the EU Business Cycle
7 
 
A popular means of quantifying the OCA "shock" criterion has been to measure 
the synchronicity of business cycles in the countries under consideration as 
candidates for currency union membership. This requires as a first step the 
identification of the cycle, involving a detrending procedure of some kind; what 
procedure to use is a matter of some controversy. Baxter and King (1995) 
provide an informative review of some of the most commonly used methods. 
Those we focus on here involve three alternative methods of smoothing. A 
somewhat different methodology i s then explored, a Markov-switching model 
based on the example of Hamilton (1994). This latter method is then extended to 
explore the idea that there is a common 'European' cycle underlying national 
stochastic experience. 
 
The growth cycle: 
 
Our main interest is in the growth cycle definition of the business cycle, or 
fluctuations around a trend and whether there has been an increased 
synchronization of the business cycle in the European countries, moving away 
from the USA business cycle, as seemed apparent in the Artis-Zhang (1997, 
1998) studies. In order to investigate this hypothesis Germany and USA are 
taken as benchmarks and comovements of the rate of growth are analyzed with 
respect to these countries. The series are first corrected for outliers and then 
smoothed in order to reduce the importance of short run erratic fluctuations. 
Three different smoothing techniques are used: a centered seven-term moving 
average, the Hodrick - Prescott filter (dampening parameter l = 50000) and an 
unobserved component (uc) model based on the decomposition of the series 
into an irregular component and a trend component. Results from all of them are 
presented in Tables A1 and A2 below to show their robustness to the smoothing 
technique used. Two different sample periods are analyzed, one corresponding 
to 1965:5 - 1979:3 or the pre-ERM period, and a second period that goes from 
1979:4 to 1997:6, or post-ERM period. In order to analyze the degree of 
synchronization of the business cycle we first obtain cross-correlations at 
displacement zero for the two different sample periods. 
 
Relative to the advice given by Baxter and King (1995) we may note that 
the centering of the seventh-order moving average ensures that the smoothing 
does not create a change in phase. The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter derives the 
                                                                 
7 This appendix draws heavily on parts of Artis et al. (1999).  
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trend component  yt of a univariate time series yt  as the result of the following 
algorithm: 
 
   




The choice of dampening parameter in the Hodrick-Prescott application (l = 50, 
000) is based on the prior finding by Artis and Zhang (1997) that this value 
produces a cyclical series which closely resembles the trade cycle series 
produced by the OECD using traditional methods, which find some favour with 
Baxter and King. The  methods are applied to industrial production data at 
monthly frequency. 
 
Table 1: Cross correlation at displacement zero for the sample period 1965:5-1979:3 
 
Germany   USA 
 
    U.C. 
HP-filter 7-MA U.C. HP-filter 7-MA 
 
France    0.49  0.65  0.64  0.41  0.72  0.61 
ltaly    0.30  0.37  0.35  0.39  0.58  0.52 
NL     0.71  0.79  0.71  0.34  0.43  0.39 
Austria    0.47  0.63  0.54  0.27  0.44  0.34 
Belgium    0.59  0.69  0.63  0.43  0.63  0.52 
Spain    0.42  0.48  0.38  0.38  0.64  0.45 
Portugal    0.28  0.41  0.23  0.15  0.52  0.24 
UK    0.40  0.64  0.56  0.32  0.75  0.58 
 
The application of these three alternative forms of detrending produces cyclical 
components the cross correlations among which are taken as measures of 
synchronicity. Inspection of the results suggests that the main features are in fact 
robust across the detrending methods used. In particular, there appears to be a 
general increase in the degree of synchronization with the German cycle relative 
to that with the US between the pre-ERM and ERM periods, with the exception 
of the UK.  




ApplyMg the Markov-swttching method 
 
The Markov-switching autoregressive(MS-AR) time series model has become 
increasingly popular since Hamilton's application of it to the 
 
Table 2: Cross correlation at displacement zero for the sample period 1979:4-1997:6 
 
  Germany  USA 
  U.C.   HP-filter     7-MA    U.C.     HP-filter  7-MA 
 
France    0.57  0.69  0.62  0.17  0.34  0.29 
Italy    0.25  0.43  0.40  0.24  0.30  0.23 
NL     0.36  0.48  0.34  0.17  0.31  0.25 
Austria    0.54  0.73  0.57  0.07  0.22  0.11 
Belgium    0.48  0.56  0.46  0.07  0.18  0.15 
Spain    0.49  0.38  0.32  0.19  0.17  0.14 
Portugal    0.26  0.30  0.25  -0.12  -0.18  -0.13 
UK      0.32  0.16  0.26  0.24  0.35  0.36 
 
US business cycle (Hamilton 1994). Contractions and expansions are modelled 
as switching regimes of the stochastic process generating the growth rate of real 
GNP Dyt: 
 
Dyt - m (St) = al (Dyt-1  - m (St-1))+. . .+ a4 (Dyt-4 - m (St-4))+Ut.    (5) 
 
The regimes are associated with different conditional distributions of the growth 
rate of real GNP, where the mean m1, is positive in the first regime ('expansion') 
and negative in the second regime ('contraction'), m2 < 0. 
 
The general idea behind this class of regime-switching models is that the 
parameters of a VAR depend upon a stochastic, unobservable regime variable St 
˛ {1, …, M} The stochastic process for generating the unobservable regimes is 
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By inferring the probabilities of the unobserved regimes conditional on an 
available information set, it is then possible to reconstruct the regimes
8. The data 
are seasonally adjusted monthly industrial production indices for the eight 
economies from 1970:1 to 1996:12, drawn from the OECD database. For 
synchronicity, we here use the cross-correlation at displacement zero of the 
smoothed probabilities of recession. These data are shown in Table B3, for the 
whole span of the data. These smoothed probabilities are obtained from fitting 
univariate MS-AR to each individual countries. The relatively much weaker 
correlation of the UK with Germany, relative to other countries, is again evident. 
The frequency of relatively high cross-correlation coefficients in the matrix 
suggests that the notion of a "European cycle" , a common cycle driving the 
national cycles, might be correct. 
 
Table 3: Cross correlation at displacement zero of the smoothed probability of being in a 
recession for the sample period 1970:1-1996:7 
 
Germany France Italy    NL      Austria     Belgium   Spain      Port.ugal     UK 
 
 Germany  1.00 
  France  0.54  1.00 
  Italy  0.46  0.49  1.00 
  NL    0.73  0.53  0.55  1.00 
  Austria  0.61  0.73  0.64  0.70  1.00 
 Belgium  0.55  0.82  0.40  0.59  0.65  1.00 
  Spain  0.53  0.34  0.28  0.45  0.39  0.35  1.00 
 Portugal  0.54  0.72  0.29  0.34  0.56  0.53  0.40  1.00 
  UK    0.34  0.29  0.21  0.25  0.12  0.39  0.55  0.34
  1.00 
 
 
The European BusMess Cycle 
 
The high cross-correlation of the smoothed probabilities from the univariate 
MS-AR suggests the existence of a European Business Cycle. In order to test for 
the existence of such a common cycle in this framework we consider a 
three-regime Markov-switching vector autoregression (MS-VAR) with 
regime-dependent covariances: 
 
Dyt  = n (st) + A1, Dyt-1 + A7Dyt-7 + ut, ut| st ~ NID (0, S(st)),     (7) 
 
                                                                 
8 Maximum likelihood (ML) estimation of the model is based on a version of the 
Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm. All the computations reported in this paper were carried 
out in Ox 1.20a..  
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where  Dyt is the vector of growth rates (first differences smoothed by taking 
seven-month moving averages and controlled for outliers). Three vectors 









Figure B2: The European Business Cycle 
 
The contribution of the European business cycle to the process of economic 
growth in the nine European c ountries is depicted in Figure BL The 
lightly-shaded dashed lines represent the national fluctuations and the 
heavily-shaded solid line is the European cycle contribution in each case. The 
presence of the third regime in this growth model of the European business cycle  
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reflects the catching-up process of some of the countries. Figure B2 shows the 
time-distribution of the three regimes of the European cycle; region 1 is the 
recession regime, region 2 is a growth regime and region 3 a 'high growth' 
regime. This reflects basically the experience of the Southern countries at this 
time. This latter regime dominates only in the early part of the sample. Later on, 
the oil shocks show up in the mid 70s and early 80s and the recession of the 
early nineties is well detected. 
 
 
Appendix C. Differences in transmission mechanisrns 
 
Studies of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the European 
countries have proliferated in recent years. The two principal approaches 
employed to illuminate the issue are: simulations on multicountry econometric 
models (or numerical simulation models) and SVAR studies in which the impulse 
response functions are compared. 
 
With respect to the position of the UK in these comparative studies, a 
strong prior was developed in the wake of the 1992 ERM crisis. Explaining the 
difficulty for the UK of undertaking further interest rate increases at that time, 
observers pointed to the much greater extent of floating rate consumer debt in 
the UK, and the special role of housing finance within it. Maclennan et al. (1988) 
have recently extended the discussion of the latter point. The presumption was 
established that the monetary transmission mechanism for the UK would be 
distinctive in the large size of its effects on output and the comparative rapidity 
with which a monetary policy intervention would have its effects. From this 
standpoint it seemed easy to appreciate that the imposition of a common 
monetary policy might itself lead, not to a greater symmetry of the UK cycle to 
the cycle in continental Europe, but quite possibly to the opposite effect. 
 
The presumption that the transmission process of monetary policy was 
different for the UK in the way described was borne out in an early multi-country 
model exercise by Mean (1994). An exercise conducted at the BIS by Smets 
(1995) using the domestic models employed by Central Banks also confirmed "a 
British difference " (though much larger differences were reported here between 
some non-European countries and the Europeans as a group). A more recent 
model-based study from the Bank of England (Britton and Whitley 1997), 
however, found no large differences between the economies under study 
(France, Germany and the UK) whilst the analysis due to Dornbusch et al. (1998) 
suggests that monetary policy effects in  the UK might, if anything, be smaller 
than elsewhere in Europe.  
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There is a variety of studies employing some kind of SVAR estimation and 
the approach itself remains controversial. By analysing the effects of innovations 
to the interest rate (monetary policy) process the approach seeks to purge the 
estimate of monetary policy effects of contamination from the effects of the 
economy on monetary policy. A problem of interpretation is then whether the 
estimates represent accurately the effects of 'normal' monetary policy. In 
addition, especially in early versions of the approach, the results yielded a series 
of "puzzles"  - notably the "price puzzle" where restrictive monetary policy is 
shown as leading to inflation and the "exchange rate puzzle" where restrictive 
monetary policy is shown as leading to an exchange rate depreciation. These 
puzzles have been eliminated in later work by a more appropriate choice of 
information variables and identification restrictions. But the approach still remains 
controversial: Cochrane (1998) provides a recent critique. The study by Gerlach 
and Smets (1995) was an early and influential example of the genre; it suggested 
no large differences in the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy among 
the C-7. Ramaswarny and Sloek (1998) find the UK to be in a group of countries 
where monetary policy is more powerful than it is in a second group. Ehrmann 
(1998) is among the latest in this line; it detects the most powerful effects to be 
those attaching to Germany's transmission mechanisms, though the UK is 
something of an outlier in relation to the persistence of output effects and their 
time profile. 
 
Will arbitrage reduce the differences? 
 
It is plausible that some of the differences in monetary policy transmission will be 
arbitraged away. Interest rates on securitized loans will be brought into line by 
arbitrage. But does this mean that, for example, the differences that exist between 
countries in the relationship between Central Bank intervention ("policy") rates 
and bank base rates (Borio and Fritz, 1995) will disappear? Most bank lending is 
done in the framework of a banker-client relationship, where anonymity is denied. 
Arbitrage is consequently inhibited. But EMU is widely expected to 'complete' 
the European Financial Area. Bank mergers, cross-border tie-ups and arbitrage in 
the more footloose corporate market can be expected to lend in time to greater 
homogenization of practices. Studies of what this might mean are few and far 
between: Dornbusch et al. (1998) is one exception. An interesting study from the 
US (Carlino and Fina, 1998) points out that considerable differences persist 
across the States of the U.S., even if much of these differences can be explained 
by differences in the industrial composition, size mix and so on of the banks' 
clientele in each State. 